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Abstract—We have collected and analysed prices for more
than 1.4 million flight tickets involving 63 destinations and
125 airlines and have found that common sense violation i.e.,
discrepancies between what consumers would expect and what
truly holds for those prices, are far more frequent than one
would think. For example, oftentimes the price of a single leg
flight is higher than two-leg flights that include it under similar
terms of travel (class, luggage allowance, etc.). This happened
for up to 24.5% of available fares on a specific route in our
dataset invalidating the common expectation that “further is
more expensive”. Likewise, we found several two-leg fares where
buying each leg independently leads to lower overall cost than
buying them together as a single ticket. This happened for up
to 37% of available fares on a specific route invalidating the
common expectation that “bundling saves money”. Last, several
single stop tickets in which the two legs were separated by 1-5
days (called multicity fares), were oftentimes found to be costing
more than corresponding back-to-back fares with a small transit
time. This was found to be occurring in up to 7.5% fares on a
specific route invalidating that “a short transit is better than a
longer one”.
I. INTRODUCTION
The so-called information asymmetry has historically ham-
pered consumers in their negotiations with market-savvy sell-
ers. One of the promises of the world-wide-web has been
to eradicate this information asymmetry for the benefit of
consumers. For example, price comparison sites allow buyers
to easily compare the prices of different stores for the same
item or service. Similarly, consumer and employment fora
provide information about once hidden bids for real estate [2]
or salary levels [1], thus making it easier for individuals to
negotiate with sellers.
Traveling, and in particular airline flights, has been one of
the sectors benefiting the most from the information open-
nesses offered by the web. Where once a traveler was totally
dependent upon a travel agent for getting the right deal for him,
now a customer can have direct access to myriads of travel
options and real time prices and can thus select on his own.
Travelers have been delighted by the ability to get access to
raw flight pricing information coupled with advanced features
for searching it and comparing across different carriers.
Simultaneously, however, travelers are being exposed to the
sheer complexity of flight ticket pricing that includes a huge
number of factors, that when all put together it makes it quite
impossible to know when one is getting a better deal and
when not, despite the existence of readily searchable data and
advanced search functions.
Indeed, putting together yield management (thus variable
pricing), fares rules, taxation, level of competition, myriads
of different flight classes and levels within a class, different
sellers and meta resellers of tickets, etc., creates a number
of alternatives that seems to defeat even the most elaborate
search facilities. From a computational complexity point of
view, finding the cheapest fare or fares for a specific route is a
hard problem for the online search engines and the travelers[3].
Therefore, it seems that although the information asymmetry
barrier has been lifted, a new complexity asymmetry barrier has
promptly replaced it. Travelers are overloaded with the sheer
amount of options offered to them and thus, in the end, are
rather doubtful about whether they are getting the best possible
deal or not.
Their confusion is sometimes caused by observed violations
of what most consider, or take for granted, as a “common
sense” rule in flight ticket pricing. Take for example the
following three common sense rules:
1) Common Sense 1 (CS1). “A multi-leg ticket should cost
more than its individual legs”. The cost of the multi-
leg ticket is obviously higher than any of its legs. A
violation of this common sense is usually called “hidden
city ticketing”.
2) Common Sense 2 (CS2). “The price of a single stop
flight should be lower than bying the individual legs
separately”. “Bundling” is supposed to save money for
the consumer.
3) Common Sense 3 (CS3). “If customer convenience is
driving price then short transit (e.g. 1-2 hours) should
cost more than split by day flights (second leg after 1 or
more days)”. Customers would rather do a quick transit
rather than spend a day at an airport hotel or even worse
at waiting area or lounge.
There are anecdotal rumors on violations of the above
common sense rules [5],[4]. But still, it is widely unknown
how frequently such violations occur, in which routes, which
airlines, and when. Interestingly, there is more awareness as
to why such violations occur (competition in pricing over dif-
ferent routes, computational complexity of pricing algorithms)
as opposed to the quantitative questions posed above.
Our contribution: In this paper we present a quantitative
study on the above mentioned questions about CS violations
in a dataset containing tickets in routes in Europe. Using an
online search engine for airline fares, we retrieved around
1.4 million tickets and performed an analysis to identify
and calculate the violations percentages for each violation
presented above.
Summary of results:
• Overall (across all routes), 1.53% of the single stop
fares have CS1 violations. It is clear that the violations
of CS1 do not happen frequently across the dataset.
However, for some particular routes, there is a relatively
high percentage of violations. The BRU-STR route has a
24.5% violations. Similarly, specific airlines have a large
number of violations. A Dutch airline has 565 violations
in 1055 single stop tickets in our dataset. A Scandinavian
airline has 209 violations in 4659 single stop tickets.
• Overall, 1.99% of the single stop fares have CS2 viola-
tions. Again, despite the low overall frequency across the
63 routes of the dataset, in specific routes the violations
have high frequency. In ORY-TLS CS2 violations reached
39.3%.
• Overall 5.75% of the single stop tickets in the dataset
have CS3 violations. The biggest percentage is in OSL-
CPH route, with 26.7% violations.
Please note that our objective is not to explain why these
violations occur, but when and where they occur and by which
airlines. The why, if at all possible to answer, would require
deep insight into the way that airlines operate, which is clearly
beyond our capacity and intention.
II. DATASET
To gather our dataset of airline tickets for analysis, we
queried matrix.itasoftware.com, an online search engine for
airfares. Matrix uses a database of flights, prices, and seat
availability that is updated by the private networks of most of
the airlines of the world. Based on a user provided query for a
trip, it returns all the available options, i.e., all available fares
that match the route and travel dates. It also returns detailed
information about the fares, booking codes and the rules that
apply.
In order to have a balanced dataset, we chose routes that
span a variety of Hub and Regional airports. We classify an
airport as Hub if it is in the 20 most busy airports of 2013
according to Wikipedia1. Otherwise we classify it as non-Hub
(Regional).
A. Dataset description
In total the data contain 1404942 tickets across 63 routes in
Europe for departing dates across 2014 and 2015. The crawling
of the itasoftware service and the collection of the tickets
tool place in 2014 Out of the 63 routes, 20 were between
hub airports, 20 between hub and regional airports and the
1https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of the busiest airports in Europe
remaining 23 between regional. The selection of the airports
was done at random from the list of the busiest airports in
Europe. For example, for a hub-to-hub route, we chose two
random airports from the 20 most busy airports (as explained
above).
We collected three different types of fares
• Single stop. Tickets that comprise two flights (legs).
• Separate legs. Tickets that are direct and correspond to
one leg of a single stop ticket. Specifically, after having
retrieved a single stop ticket, we query for two direct
tickets that correspond to each one of the legs of the
single stop ticket.
• Multicity. Similar to single stop but the date of the second
leg is specified by the user. In our case, we query for
tickets where the date of the second leg is after 1-5 days
from the first.
The distribution of the tickets in the different types is shown
in Table I.
TABLE I
THE NUMBER OF COLLECTED TICKETS PER CATEGORY
Single stop Separate legs Multicity
129105 449919 825918
B. Data collection
Although matrix.itasoftware.com does not offer an API, all
the data passed between the browser and the service are JSON
formatted. Thus, we were able to write a python program that
queries the service, parses the JSON response and stores the
data in a database.
Our crawler queries matrix.itasoftware.com and collects
data about airfares, using the PlanetLab infrastructure and
the SOCKS protocol. Each PlanetLab node acts as a SOCKS
proxy and each request is tunneled through a proxy chosen
randomly. The steps are shown in Fig. 1
• In step 1, we make a request for fares for a specific route,
date and type of ticket (direct, single stop, multicity).
• In step 2, we get the list of available fares.
• In step 3, we request the details for each fare returned in
step 2. These details include: fare price, list of taxes and
their prices, list of legs, list of booking codes. All data
are stored in a MySQL database.
The crawling starts by quering for single stop tickets (two
legs). The middle stop airport is saved and, subsequently, the
crawler queries for direct tickets: depart airport - middle stop
and middle stop - arrival airport. Thus, for each single stop
ticket, we query the price of each one of its legs as if it were
being booked as a single direct flight. Finally, we query for
multicity fares.
We used MySQL to store the collected information.
III. ANALYSIS
Next, we present our quantitative analysis of the three
types of common sense violation that we have defined on the
introduction. We make sure that any fares that are compared
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Fig. 1. The architecture of the crawler
have (1) the same booking code (T, Y, X, etc.), (2) are offered
by the same airline, and (3) are collected during the same day.
Each ticket price consists of two parts: the fare price and
the taxes. Thus, when two tickets are found to have different
prices any of these components might have been the reason.
For example, the taxes might be identical but the fare prices
might be different. In the following sections, we present all
violations (caused by either different fare prices or taxes) as
well as those that are guaranteed to be only due to fare prices.
A. Common Sense 1
Common Sense 1 compares the price of entire single stop
tickets with the prices of its separate legs when booked as
independent direct flights. For each single stop ticket, we
retrieve the equivalent direct fares for each leg of the single
stop ticket. To be considered equivalent, such a direct fare
must have the same flight number and booking code (T, Y, X,
etc.) with the respective leg flight number of the single stop
ticket.2
If any of the respective direct tickets is more expensive than
the relevant single stop ticket then we have a violation of CS1
and count it.
In Fig. 2 we show the violations percentages for each route.
The labels indicate the number of fares for each route, and
the violations percentage (y-axis) indicate the portion of these
fares that violate CS1. Also, in the labels we show the number
of airlines that have fares in each route. All CS1 violations
in our dataset are caused by different fare prices. This is
in contrast to CS2,3 where there are violations caused by
different taxes (section 3.2).
2However, in some cases, airlines do not offer the same booking codes for
both the single stop fare and the separate leg fare. A possible explanation of
this is the seat availability management done by the airlines.
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Fig. 2. Percentages of the tickets that violate common sense 1. The labels
indicate the number of fares per route and the number of airlines that have
fares in each route
As shown in Fig. 2 there are 6 routes out of the 64 that
have a CS1 violations percentage above 5%. Overall half of
the routes (32) had at least one violation. Although the CS1
violations are not so common across the entire dataset (1.53%),
when they are observed on a particular route, their frequency
can be high, as in BRU-STR 3 where it reaches 24%. To
investigate what happens in the BRU-STR route we plot the
breakdown of CS1 violations per route and airline. We intend
to see is whether a high percentage of CS1 violation on a route
is attributed to several of the airlines operating on the route,
or it is the result of the pricing policy of one or few airlines.
We do this in Fig. 3 from which we conclude that, usually,
one or two airlines cause the majority of the violations on
a route with high frequency of CS1 violations. This means
3www.world-airport-codes.com
that the violations are a result of the policies of particular
airlines rather than a result of the route itself. From Fig. 3 it is
clear that for FRA-ZRH, BRU-STR, HEL-WAW the majority
of violations come from just two airlines (the Scandinavian
airline, the Dutch airline).
We now turn into re-examining the data per airline instead of
per route. In Fig. 4 we show the percentages of violations for
each airline. For each airline these violations might be spread
across one or many routes. We examine this distribution in the
next section.
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Fig. 4. Percentages of the tickets per airline that violate common sense 1
We see that the Dutch airline has an exceptionally high
percentage of violations (53.5%). The Greek airline and the
Belgian airline are around 10% and most others are below
10%. In absolute numbers, the Dutch airline has the most
violations (565) with the Scandinavian airline coming second
(209). In the next section we focus in the airlines with the most
violations, and we research the distribution of the violations
in different routes.
1) The airlines with the highest number of CS1 violations:
As shown in Fig. 4, the Dutch airline has the highest per-
centage of violations on the fares that it offers (53.5%). The
Greek airline comes second with 13.6% of its single stop
fares violating CS1. The distribution of the violations in the
routes that the Dutch airline offers is shown in Table II. The
violations happen in five routes. As shown, most violations of
the Dutch airline (37.9%) happen on FRA-ZRH. Furthermore,
for the first four (FRA-ZRH, BRU-STR, SVO-BRU, HEL-
WAW), the Dutch airline causes the vast majority of the
violations for these routes, as shown in Fig. 3.
TABLE II
DISTRIBUTION OF THE VIOLATIONS PER ROUTE FOR THE DUTCH AIRLINE
Route Violations (%)
FRA-ZRH 37.88
BRU-STR 23.54
SVO-BRU 21.6
HEL-WAW 15.04
MUC-IST 1.95
The Scandinavian airline is second in absolute number of
violations (218 violations). The distribution of violations is
shown in Fig. 5. Almost half of the violations (48.62%) that
the Scandinavian airline has in its fares take place in FRA-
ZRH. In total, the Scandinavian airline has CS1 violations in
ten routes.
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Fig. 5. Distribution of the violations per route for the Scandinavian airline
Based on the above graphs, it is clear that both airlines
seem to have a special policy for FRA-ZRH. The majority of
the violations in this route are by the Dutch airline and the
Scandinavian airline.
As shown in Fig. 4, the Greek airline has the second largest
percentage of CS1 violations (13.6%). In the dataset, the Greek
airline has all its CS1 violations in the ARN-ATH route.
A similar situation exists for the Belgian airline: half of
the violations take place in ATH-LHR. Three more routes
follow (ZRH-LHR, GVA-ATH, ZRH-MUC) with much lower
frequencies.
We conclude that the violating airlines have their violations
distributed in a number of routes (from one to ten in the case
of the Scandinavian airline). However, in each airline there
is a single route where the majority (40-50%) of the airline’s
violations take place.
B. Common Sense 2
Here, we derive all combinations of the available tickets
for the first leg with the available tickets for the second leg,
to create a two legs ticket equivalent to the original single
stop ticket. If this “created” ticket is more expensive than
the single stop ticket then we have a violation of CS2. The
violations could be caused by differences in fare prices, or
different taxes between the compared tickets 4 In contrast to
CS1, the CS2 violations are caused by both different prices
and different taxes. To illustrate this difference, we show the
violations percentages per route in both the case of violations
caused by different full prices (i.e., different taxes, different
fare prices, or both) and by different fare prices alone. The
full price violations of CS2 are shown in Fig. 6.
4The different taxes are imposed by the airports.
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There are nine routes that have violations above 5%. In
one case (ORY-TLS) the violations percentage reaches 39.3%.
In total, there are 21 routes that have violations above 1%.
However, most of them (18) have percentages below 10%.
As in CS1, although that the overall violation frequency is
low (1.99%), for specific routes the violations percentage is
significant.
The violations caused by different fare prices only are
shown in Fig. 7
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Fig. 7. Percentages of the tickets per route that violate common sense 2
caused by different fare prices
In this plot we have excluded the violations that are caused
by different taxes i.e., violations that originate from airports
policies5. As can be seen, only nine airlines have violations
here. Still, the top three airlines that had violations percentags
above 10% in Fig. 6 have the same number of violations as
in Fig. 7.
In the remaining part of this section we will focus on the
violations that are caused by different fare prices only. The
reason is that we strive to capture possible airlines policies
that lead to CS2 violations, and not violations that are caused
by different taxes imposed by airports or states. Along these
lines, in Fig. 9 we depict the airlines with CS2 violations
percentage above 1%.
To find out whether the airlines violate CS2 in one or many
routes, in Fig. 8 we depict the distribution of violating airlines
per route. Similarly to CS1 violations, usually a single or
two airlines are responsible for the majority of CS2 violations
5As described in the dataset description, our dataset contains detailed
information about the fare price and the prices of the taxes for each ticket.
in a route. This means that the violations must relate to the
pricing policies of these airlines and not so much on the routes
themselves.
Next, we focus exclusively on the airlines and their vi-
olations. In Fig. 9 we depict the airlines with the highest
frequency of CS2 violations.
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Fig. 9. Percentages of the fare prices of specific airlines that violate
common sense 2. In this plot are shown only the violations that are caused
by differences in the fare prices (we excluded violations caused by different
taxes).
We see that there are four airlines with violations above 5%
out of seven airlines that have violations in our dataset. In one
case, (Portuguese airline) the violations reach 27.16%.
1) The airlines with the highest number of CS2 violations:
The Portuguese airline has the highest percentage of CS2
violations, at 27.16%. All violations take place in GVA-OPO
route, as shown in Fig. 8. The Spanish airline has 6.8%
violations spread across a number of routes. The majority
of the violations take place in LGW-FCO (81 violations)
and a few violations take place in CDG-BRU (3 violations).
Similarly, the Norwegian airline has all violations in LGW-
CPH (21 violations).
The above distributions indicate that in CS2, the top violat-
ing airlines have the vast majority of their violations in one
route. This is in contrast to CS1, where the top CS1 violating
airlines have violations across a number of routes. Although
in CS1 we see that one route has most violations, there is
a number of other routes where the violations are distributed.
Here, the CS2 violations are much more concentrated: in most
cases they take place in a single route for each airline.
C. Common sense 3
Here we focus on single stop tickets where the second leg
comes after 1-5 days from the date of the first leg (these tickets
are called multicity tickets). We compare the prices of these
tickets with the equivalent single stop tickets where the second
leg is on the same day as the first leg. Normally, we expect
the multicity fare to be cheaper, since users do not want to
have the delays in transit that the multicity tickets have. If
the multicity ticket is more expensive we count it as a CS3
violation.
After analyzing the dataset, we found that most violations
are caused by different taxes between the compared tickets:
in the multicity tickets, some airports impose extra taxes
compared to the single stop fares where the second leg is on
the same day as the first leg. For example, in the UK, there is
the United Kingdom Air Passenger Duty tax, which is included
only in the tickets where the second leg is after 24 hours from
the first.
When focusing on the airlines, most violating airlines have
violations in a small number of routes. For most routes, all
violations are caused by one airline. This indicates that each
airline focuses on specific routes and causes all violations in
these routes.
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Fig. 10. Percentages of the tickets that violate common sense 3. These are
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violating routes
In Fig. 10 we depict the CS3 violations on the full prices of
the tickets. There are 11 routes which have violations above
10%. Thus, CS3 seems to be much more common compared
to CS1 & 2.
As described previously, most CS3 violations are caused
by different taxes imposed by the airports. This is shown in
Fig. 11 where, for the ten most violated (in absolute numbers)
routes, we plot the percentages of the violations that have
different taxes and different fare prices.
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In Fig. 12 we depict routes that have CS3 violations caused
strictly by fare price.
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indicaate the number of fares for each route in the dataset, and the number
of airlines that have fares in each route.
Compared with CS1,2 violations, it is clear that fewer routes
have CS3 violations caused only by different fare prices. There
is only one route that has a percentage above 5%. Furthermore,
there are only fifteen routes that have a percentage above 1%.
Having excluded the violations that are caused by taxes
(i.e., by the airports policies) we can further investigate the
violations and identify the airlines that cause them. In Fig. 13,
the CS3 violations per airline are shown.
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Fig. 13. Percentages of the tickets per airline that violate common sense 3
The Serbian airline has the highest percentage of CS3
violations (60.4%). Next is the Russian airline with 25.2%
and the Latvian airline with 9.2%. In absolute numbers, the
most violations are with Scandinavian airline (177).
1) The airlines with the highest number of CS3 violations:
The Serbian airline has the biggest violations percentage
with 60.36% violations. (137 violations over 227 single stop
tickets). In Fig. III we show the distribution of violations for
the Serbian airline.
TABLE III
PERCENTAGES OF VIOLATIONS PER ROUTE FOR THE SERBIAN AIRLINE
Route Violations (%)
ZRH-ATH 45.99
ATH-BRU 45.26
ARN-ATH 5.11
The majority of the violations take place in two routes.
For ZRH-ATH and ATH-BRU, the Serbian airline has all
violations in these routes. For ARN-ATH, violations are both
from the Serbian airline and the Latvian airline.
The Russian airline is second with a 25.2% violations (126
over 500 single stop tickets). The distribution of the violations
in different routes for the Russian airline is shown in Table IV.
TABLE IV
PERCENTAGES OF VIOLATIONS PER ROUTE FOR THE RUSSIAN AIRLINE
Route Violations (%)
AMS-IST 61.1
MUC-DME 14.3
LHR-IST 15.1
CDG-IST 9.5
For MUC-DME the violations come from both the Russian
airline and the Latvian airline. For all other routes, all viola-
tions come from the Russian airline.
The Latvian airline has a 9.2% violations percentage (68
over 739 fares). The distribution of the violations is shown in
Table V.
TABLE V
PERCENTAGES OF VIOLATIONS PER ROUTE FOR THE LATVIAN AIRLINE
Route Violations (%)
ARN-VIE 76.7
MUC-DME 16.7
ARN-ATH 6.7
Most violations of the Latvian airline take place in ARN-
VIE. In this route, all violations are from the Latvian airline.
Air Baltic also has some violations in MUC-DME, ARN-
ATH, where the Russian airline and the Serbian airline have
violations.
IV. CONCLUSION
We performed an analysis of airline fare prices in a
dataset of 1.4 million airline tickets collected from ma-
trix.itasoftware.com. We measured the frequencies of three
commmon sense violations (on single stop and multicity fares),
and found out that, although overall the percentages are small
(1.53% for CS1, 1.99% for CS2, 5.75% for CS3) when
focusing on specific routes and specific airlines, the violation
frequencies can be high.
Furthermore, it seems that the violations originate from the
pricing policies of the specific airlines, rather than imposed
by the route. This is illustrated by the fact that for each route,
one or two airlines cause all violations.
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